2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Views on substantive issues of the 2005 Review Conference

Working paper submitted by the Republic of Korea

Non-proliferation

1. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a fundamental pillar of the NPT regime. Its objectives should be achieved and all obligations under the Treaty should be complied with by the States Parties.

2. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will not only contribute to enhancing regional and international peace and security but also to realizing the world free of nuclear weapons.

3. Universal adherence to the Treaty is a core element to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. As such it is closely related to achievement of non-proliferation objectives.

Safeguards and verification

4. The IAEA safeguards system is a fundamental underpinning of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Its institutional and technical capabilities to detect non-compliance make it the first line of defence against proliferation. As such, it fosters confidence in the compliance of States Parties with their non-proliferation obligations, which is a prerequisite for unimpeded international cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, through recent experiences, it has become evident that the right under Article IV of the Treaty to develop complete nuclear fuel cycles, including uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent fuel, can be misused to produce fissile material with which to develop nuclear weapons.

5. As a remedy for this situation, the Republic of Korea believes that currently there is no better tool than the early universalization of the Additional Protocol, which will greatly enhance the IAEA's inspection and verification capabilities. Universalization of the Additional Protocol would enhance confidence in the compliance of States Parties with their non-proliferation obligations. The Republic of Korea urges those States that have not yet signed or ratified the Additional Protocol to do so without further delay.

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Export controls

6. Revelations of covert nuclear weapons programmes and of the existence of an extensive nuclear procurement network awakened the international community to the real danger of nuclear terrorism through a coalition of nuclear peddlers and terrorists. This has strengthened the conviction that the international community needs new, innovative and supplementary measures for export control as much as it needs strengthening of existing export control regimes. In this regard, while the Republic of Korea endorses the leading roles of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in setting international norms for export control, it also welcomes and supports the G-8 Global Partnership and United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 to deal with the illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials involving non-State actors. In particular, the Republic of Korea attaches importance to the establishment and effective implementation of national systems of export control, as called for by resolution 1540.

7. The Republic of Korea assumed the chairmanship of the Nuclear Suppliers Group for 2003 and 2004 and is fully committed to non-proliferation objectives of the Group. In addition, the Republic of Korea assumed the chairmanship of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for 2004 and 2005. The Republic of Korea also joined the global non-proliferation efforts of the G-8 Global Partnership in 2004.

Disarmament

8. The disarmament obligations by nuclear-weapon States laid out in Article VI of the Treaty are fundamental to the full implementation of the Treaty. The Republic of Korea welcomes the significant progress made thus far in the reduction of nuclear arsenals and the commitments for further reductions under the Moscow Treaty. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea expects deeper cuts and further engagements by nuclear-weapon States.

9. The Republic of Korea recognizes the existence of perception gap between the record of nuclear-weapon States and the level of expectations held by non-nuclear-weapon States. Closing this perception gap will certainly provide nuclear-weapon States with the moral authority and the political legitimacy to strengthen non-proliferation norms while maintaining the delicate balance among the three main pillars of the NPT.

10. The Republic of Korea underscores the importance of the faithful implementation of the "Principles and Objectives" adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 13 practical steps contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

11. The Republic of Korea reaffirms the importance and urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Republic of Korea calls upon all States that have not yet ratified the Treaty, particularly those eleven States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, to do so without further delay. Meanwhile, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, it is imperative to maintain the moratorium on nuclear test explosions.

12. The Republic of Korea calls for prompt commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and its early conclusion. The Republic of Korea calls upon nuclear-weapon States and non-NPT States to declare and abide by a moratorium on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of the FMCT.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs)

13. The Republic of Korea acknowledges the important role of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in enhancing global and regional peace and security. As mechanisms to inhibit any type of availability of nuclear weapons, the NWFZs have been and will remain useful tools not only for non-proliferation but also for disarmament over the longer term. The Republic of Korea continues to support the guidelines and principles on the establishment of NWFZs that were adopted by consensus at the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission. The Republic of Korea also supports efforts to establish and expand NWFZs wherever practicable, particularly the establishment of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, as provided for in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

14. On the Korean Peninsula, an innovative initiative as similar as a nuclear-weapon-free Zone has already been taken. Both Koreas signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on 20 January 1992 and it entered into force on 19 February 1992. In this connection, North Korea is urged once again, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Joint Declaration, to dismantle all of its nuclear programmes and return to the NPT.

Negative security assurances (NSAs)

15. In order to deal with the issue of non-proliferation more fundamentally, the Republic of Korea recognizes the need to address the root causes of proliferation. In this regard, the Republic of Korea believes that one of the most effective ways to prevent proliferation is to eliminate the incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons, while ensuring that nuclear options are ultimately negative to the security interests of the proliferators. Insecurity, real or perceived, is in many instances a key motive for the pursuit of nuclear weapons. In dealing with these complexities, the international community must redouble its efforts to alleviate security concerns that have prevented certain states from joining the NPT and caused others to clandestinely pursue nuclear weapons capabilities.

16. As a practical means of reducing the sense of insecurity, the Republic of Korea supports the concept of negative security assurances. In this regard, the Republic of Korea believes that nuclear-weapon States should provide strong and credible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that faithfully meet their NPT and other safeguards obligations. At the same time, the Republic of Korea also recognizes the value of providing enhanced security assurances and other incentives to those States Parties that voluntarily accept additional non-proliferation commitments beyond the parameters of the NPT.

Reporting

17. The Republic of Korea attaches importance to transparency and accountability of nuclear-weapon States in fulfilling their disarmament obligations. Increased transparency and accountability will be conducive to reducing controversy surrounding the process of nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Republic of Korea encourages nuclear-weapon States to report progress on disarmament to the international community on a regular basis. Nuclear-weapon States are also encouraged to report on their nuclear arsenals and inventories of fissile materials for weapons purposes. However, with regard to the modality of reporting, the Republic of Korea, on a practical aspect, takes note of the view that reporting can be flexible in its scope, format and framework.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

18. The Republic of Korea places utmost value on the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a country that depends on nuclear energy for 40 per cent of its electric power supply and has the world's sixth-largest civil nuclear industry, with 19 power reactors in operation and 7 additional reactors either under construction or in the planning stages, the Republic of Korea views this inalienable right as indispensable to its sustainable development. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea believes that there should be proper safeguards against the possible abuse of this right by potential proliferators. The right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Article IV of the Treaty is not absolute, but conditioned upon compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards obligations under Articles II and III.

19. Addressing public concerns about the safety and security of nuclear power is also crucial for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, the Republic of Korea welcomes the important progress that has been made in recent years, particularly through the establishment of global norms and standards governing nuclear safety and security such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

20. The Republic of Korea reiterates the importance of the IAEA's role in vitalizing and expanding technical cooperation to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the developing world. The Republic of Korea commends the IAEA Secretariat for its dedicated efforts to enhance the Agency's technical cooperation programmes. The Republic of Korea shares the view that the Agency should be provided with sufficient resources to facilitate its technical cooperative activities.

Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle

21. In view of the direct proliferation danger associated with sensitive fuel-cycle technologies and facilities, the Republic of Korea recognizes the need to control their transfer, particularly to countries of proliferation concern or those countries that have no legitimate need for such technologies and facilities in terms of economic feasibility or energy security. In this regard, the Republic of Korea

believes that secure guarantees for fuel supply at a reasonable price should be provided to those countries that voluntarily forego the possession of sensitive fuel cycle facilities.

22. The Republic of Korea commends the Director General of the IAEA for recognizing the need to address this issue by commissioning the report of the independent Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. The Republic of Korea welcomes this report and looks forward to extensive discussions on this issue.

General issues

North Korean nuclear issue

23. North Korea's disregard for and defiance of nuclear non-proliferation norms under the NPT regime and announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty is currently the most daunting challenge.

24. In this regard, the Republic of Korea wishes the following elements to be duly reflected by the Conference:

> The Conference expresses deep concern about North Korea's nuclear programmes and particularly its recent statements that it is in possession of nuclear weapons. The Republic of Korea affirms its conviction that North Korea's nuclear programmes, along with its decision in 2003 to withdraw from the Treaty, not only pose a serious challenge to the integrity and credibility of the global non-proliferation regime but also to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and beyond. While the Conference reaffirms its commitment to the integrity of the NPT, it urges North Korea to promptly come into full compliance with the NPT, in particular, without engaging in any attempt to further deteriorate the situation. The Conference urges North Korea to dismantle, once and for all, all of its nuclear programmes, including uranium enrichment programme, in a thorough and transparent and verifiable manner. The Conference also emphasizes the importance of an expeditious resolution of this issue through peaceful and diplomatic means within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. In this regard, the Conference urges North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks without further delay.

Universality

25. The Republic of Korea welcomes the accession to the NPT by Cuba in November 2002 and by Timor-Leste in May 2003. The Republic of Korea believes that their accession will lead the Treaty one step forward toward universality of the NPT.

26. The Republic of Korea urges the three remaining States still outside the NPT, namely India, Israel and Pakistan, to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States without further delay and without preconditions, and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The three non-States Parties are also urged to refrain from acts which are contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty, including any nuclear test explosions and transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies, pending their accession to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

Withdrawal

27. The expansion of the NPT for the last 35 years is remarkable. From the initial signatories of 59 countries in 1968, its membership has now grown into a significant magnitude of 189 States Parties. The sheer number of the States Parties to the NPT attests clearly to the importance of the Treaty as a cornerstone of non-proliferation regime. The Republic of Korea shares the view that these gains should not be impaired by any attempt of withdrawal from the Treaty, while the unanimous goal of attaining universality of the Treaty should be persistently pursued.

28. The misuse of the right to withdrawal by determined proliferators, particularly through arbitrary interpretation of the provisions of Article X, poses a serious challenge to the future of the NPT. If such proliferators are allowed to withdraw from the Treaty with impunity once they have acquired necessary materials and technologies to manufacture nuclear weapons, particularly under the cover of ostensibly peaceful nuclear activities guaranteed by Article IV of the Treaty, the NPT may be faced with the unprecedented challenge of deuniversalization of the Treaty.

29. The Conference should address this issue seriously and reaffirm the principle that a State Party remains responsible for violations of the Treaty committed prior to withdrawal. The Conference should also explore viable remedial measures to this end.

Institutional deficit

30. The Republic of Korea shares the concern that the NPT regime suffers from institutional deficit. The Republic of Korea believes that the NPT needs better tools to respond more effectively and promptly to extraordinary and troubling situations involving threats to the Treaty. In this regard, the Republic of Korea welcomes proposals to adopt a new arrangement for an annual forum, making the best use of the time and resources currently allotted for the review process.